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"ANOTHER THING NEEDFUL": 
EXPLORING EMOTIONS IN LAW 
THE PASSIONS OF LAW. Edited by Susan A. Bandes.1 
New York University Press. 1999. Pp. 367. $35.00. 
Neal Feigenson2 
Law encounters emotion at every turn. Law deals with 
crimes of passion, property disputes, and divorces that involve 
fury, despair, and a dozen other feelings. Law is made and im-
plemented by legislators, judges, and jurors who, being human, 
react to the matters before them with sympathy, anger, or dis-
gust, all of which may affect their judgments. And both legal de-
cisions and the processes by which they are reached can provoke 
strong emotional responses on the part of litigants and the com-
munity-recall the widespread outrage sparked by the verdict in 
the first Rodney King trial. 
The mere ubiquity of emotion in law need not persuade le-
gal scholars and practitioners that the emotions are worth seri-
ous study. One might believe, in accord with most legal doctrine 
and dominant traditions in philosophy and jurisprudence, that 
emotional influence invariably produces inferior decisionmaking 
and is simply to be avoided, or its effects contained, where pos-
sible. This pejorative view of emotion in judgment is illustrated 
by Judge Richard Posner's remarks in his contribution to the 
present volume: 
The idea of emotion as a kind of cognitive shortcut explains 
why jurors, like children, are more likely to make emotional 
judgments than judges. The less experienced a person is at 
I. Professor of Law, DePaul University. 
2. Professor of Law, Quinnipiac University School of Law, and Research Affiliate, 
Yale University Department of Psychology. The essay's title is taken from the title of 
Chapter One in Book the Third of Charles Dickens's Hard Times (1845) and, as ex-
plained by Martha Nussbaum, one of the contributors to the present volume and perhaps 
the leadmg proponent of studying the significance of emotion in legal judgment, refers to 
the "intelligence and ineliminability" of emotion in human judgment. Martha Nuss-
baum, Emotions as Judgments of Value, 5 Yale J. Criticism 201,201 (1992). 
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reasoning through a particular kind of problem, the more 
likely that person is to "react emotionally," that is, to fall back 
on a more primitive mode of reaching a conclusion, the emo-
tional. . . . Emotions, like sex, are something that we have in 
common with animals, who, having smaller cortexes than hu-
mans, rely more heavily than humans do on emotions to guide 
their actions. 3 
Those who would police the effects of emotions in law ought at 
least to be curious about their actual workings, but that curiosity 
may be dampened by a general disdain for emotion-driven 
thinking. One might also believe that even if knowing more 
about how emotions affect behavior and judgment could help 
legislators and judges to craft better rules and decisions, no such 
reliable and practical knowledge exists beyond what lawmakers' 
"common sense" already tells them. Furthermore, one might 
take the position that the emotional repercussions of legal proc-
esses and decisions on participants and the community are not 
the law's concern. 
To capture the attention and imagination of mainstream le-
gal scholars and officials, then, a book about emotion in law 
ought to explain why at least some emotions should be regarded 
as desirable features of at least some kinds of legal judgments, 
and how we should go about distinguishing desirable from unde-
sirable emotional influences in various contexts. The book 
should ground these discussions in the best empirical research 
and theory on the emotions available in other fields. Like any 
other interdisciplinary scholarship, it should also be attentive to 
the controversies and the limits of the findings in those fields.4 
Ideally, the book would persuade readers that interdisciplinary 
scholarship can guide practical thinking about the role that spe-
cific emotions play, and should play, in framing and deciding im-
portant legal problems. 
3. Richard A. Posner, Emotion versus Emotionalism in Law, in Susan A. Bandes, 
ed., The Passions of Law 311 (New York U. Press, 1999). As the title of his essay indi-
cates, Posner is attempting to distinguish this sort of undesirable "emotionalism" from 
what he later argues is the desirable use of certain emotions (indignation and empathy) 
in judging. Id. at 322-24. Perhaps most interesting here is that by equating jurors with 
children, and thence (via sex) with animals, in their emotionality, Posner deploys "emo-
tion" in an all-too-familiar rhetorical fashion to support a hierarchy of who is best or least 
fit to render legal judgments. The premises underlying his contentions do not stand up to 
scrutiny: For instance, there is no basis for supposing that persons faced with an unfamil-
iar decisionmaking problem will fall back on emotional as opposed to non-emotional 
cognitive shortcuts. . 
4. As pointed out in another review of the present volume. Laura E. Little, Nego-
tiating the Tangle of Law and Emotion, 86 Cornell L. Rev. 974,980 (2001). 
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The Passions of Law, edited by Susan Bandes, presents thir-
teen essays by outstanding contributors who investigate the ex-
tent to which particular emotions ought to affect law.5 The con-
texts addressed range from the proper place (if any) of anger 
and vengeance-by victim, judge, or community-in punish-
ment, to whether popular disgust should be relevant to criminal-
izing a behavior or choosing a penalty for it, to the idea of ro-
mantic love underlying the Defense of Marriage Act, to the 
importance of a judge's emotional traits to his or her decision-
making. Collectively the authors deploy their considerable 
learning from "philosophy, classics, psychology, religion, ethics, 
law, and social thought" (to cite Bandes's own list on p. 7) to un-
derstand some of the myriad descriptive and normative issues 
posed by the pervasiveness of emotion in law. 
In its impressive variety of topics and approaches, The Pas-
sions of Law indeed "take[s] the conversation about emotion [in 
law] far beyond easy platitudes about the desirability of compas-
sion, mercy, and love or the dangers of vengeance and resent-
ment." (pp. 14-15) The authors' insightful and intellectually 
rigorous normative analyses should persuade even casual read-
ers that the place of emotion in law deserves much closer study. 
The use of empirical research on the emotions in psychology and 
elsewhere to inform specific issues the editor and authors them-
selves raise, however, is less consistent, somewhat hampering the 
collection from achieving the editor's laudable Legal Realist aim 
of grounding law in (what we think we know about) reality. 6 
The Passions of Law does not offer an overarching theory 
of the emotions or their effects on legal decisionmaking. This is 
as it should be, because no generally agreed-upon theory exists. 
Bandes recognizes that emotion theory and research is im-
mensely complex and that the role of emotions in behavior, in-
cluding social judgments, is highly variable and context-
dependent. (pp. 8, 13) The particularity of the essays is thus 
well suited to the present state of psychological (and other) 
knowledge about emotion. The better pieces manage to avoid 
what Bandes identifies as the twin dangers of reductionism (ig-
noring the complexities and uncertainties in what other disci-
plines have learned about emotions) and paralysis (treating 
5. The Passions of Law arose in part from a conference on the subject of law and 
emotion held at the University of Chicago Law School in May, 1998. 
6. Susan Bandes, Introduction, in Passions at 8 (cited in note 3) ("(a]t some point, 
we need to take what we know (about emotions] ... and incorporate it into our deci-
sionmaking processes"). 
448 CONSTITUTIONAL COMMENTARY [Vol. 18:445 
those complexities and uncertainties as grounds for rejecting 
emotion theory and research as an aid to legal decision and poli-
cymaking). (p. 8) I will mention just a few examples of the au-
thors' nuanced knowledge of other fields and their application of 
that knowledge to specific legal issues. 
Martha Nussbaum argues that disgust should be irrelevant 
to law-contrary to current practice in a variety of contexts, con-
stitutional and other.7 For instance, the disgust of an average 
member of the community is considered central to defining ex-
pression as obscene and thus unprotected by the First Amend-
ment.8 Statutes allowing capital juries to impose the death pen-
alty for crimes they believe to be "outrageously or wantonly vile, 
horrible and inhuman" (or similar language), some of which 
have been held to violate the Eighth Amendment, invite jurors 
to factor their disgust into their sentencing decisions.9 And the 
disgust of a killer for his victim's homosexuality is sometimes 
recognized as a mitigating factor in homicide. 10 
Nussbaum first summarizes the psychology of disgust, point-
ing out that "[i]n all societies ... disgust expresses a refusal to 
ingest and thus be contaminated by a potent reminder of one's 
own mortality and animality," (p. 25) and that disgust often 
works by means of "psychological contamination." We may be 
disgusted by something not because it is offensive in itself but 
because it has either been in contact with or is perceived to re-
semble a disgusting substance. (p. 28) Nussbaum argues that 
due to these essential features," disgust as a type of emotion is 
inherently unsuited to law. Law should reflect collective judg-
ments based on the "public exchange of reasons," but feeling 
7. Martha C. Nussbaum, 'Secret Sewers of Vice': Disgust, Bodies, and the Law, in 
Passions at 19-62 (cited in note 3). 
8. Id at 39; see Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15 (1973) (stating obscenity test). 
9. Nussbaum, 'Secret Sewers of Vice' at 49-50 (cited in note 7); see, e.g., Godfrey v. 
Georgia, 446 U.S. 420 (1980) (holding that statute permitting death sentence if offense 
"outrageously or wantonly vile, horrible and inhuman" violated Eighth and Fourteenth 
Amendments). 
10. Nussbaum, 'Secret Sewers of Vice' at 35-38 (cited in note 7). 
II. Cognitive emotion theorists (of whom Nussbaum is one) posit that each type of 
emotion has a distinct "cognitive structure" which reflects the kind of appraisal of and 
reaction to the world that that emotion (implicitly) represents. See, e.g., Andrew Or-
tony, Gerald L. Clore, and Allan Collins, The Cognitive Structure of Emotions (Cam-
bridge U. Press, 1988). Similarly, psychologist Richard Lazarus calls each emotion's de-
fining structure its "core relational theme." Richard Lazarus, Universal Antecedents of 
the Emotions, in Paul Ekman and Richard J. Davidson, eds., The Nature of Emotion 163, 
164 (Oxford U. Press, 1994) (defining the core relational theme of disgust, e.g., as 
"[t]aking in or being too close to an indigestable [sic] object or idea (metaphorically 
speaking)"). 
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disgust does not "provide[] the disgusted person with a set of 
reasons that can be used for purposes of public persuasion." 
(p. 27) One cannot formulate "publicly articulable reasons" to 
persuade another to be disgusted by something that person is not 
already disgusted by. (p. 27) In this respect disgust is unlike, 
say, anger and indignation, which are based (in part) on the per-
ception that one (or one's community) has been wronged. 12 
"The reasons underlying a person's indignation can be false or 
groundless," but often those reasons can at least be identified 
and articulated; and "if they stand up to scrutiny, we can expect 
our friends and fellow citizens to share them." (p. 26) 
Might the experience of disgust nevertheless be valuable to 
legal decisionmakers by providing a visceral signal that some-
thing is to be disvalued and hence avoided?13 No, argues Nuss-
baum, because our occasional disgust reactions toward other 
people are too likely to have been socially engineered by domi-
nant groups to disparage and exclude disfavored groups: women, 
Jews, homosexuals, persons of color. 14 For the law to recognize 
a jury's disgust at an allegedly obscene object or a criminal's dis-
gust at his homosexual victim (Nussbaum analyzes specific cases 
of each in detail) is to validate misogynistic or homophobic fears 
of bodily contamination-not justifications that belong in a de-
mocratic society committed to equality. (pp. 35-42) Moreover, 
for the law to permit a jury to take its disgust (as opposed to its 
anger or even outrage) at a homicide into account when 
determining how severely to punish the offender is to encourage 
the perception of criminal defendants as "heinous monsters 
more or less outside the boundaries of our moral universe," 
(p. 50) an attitude that fosters ever more extreme reactions to 
crime and protects us from having to consider whether we 
ourselves might not do awful things were our luck and 
circumstances different. (pp. 51-52) 
12. Nussbaum, 'Secret Sewers of Vice' at 26 (cited in note 7); see also Lazarus, Uni· 
versa[ Antecedents at 164 (cited in note 11) (defining core relational theme of anger as 
"[a) demeaning offense against me and mine"). 
13. See, e.g., Antonio R. Damasio, Descartes' Error: Emotion, Reason, and the 
Human Brain 165-201 (G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1994) (defining emotions as "somatic mark-
ers" that help us to choose among alternative courses of action). 
14. Nussbaum, 'Secret Sewers of Vice' at 29 (cited in note 7); cf. Daniel Farber and 
Suzanna Sherry, The Pariah Principle, 13 Const. Conun. 257, 265-67 (1996) (describing 
people's experiences of being treated as untouchables or pariahs, and arguing that the 
equal protection clause stands for the principle that government cannot pass legislation 
that creates or encourages that sort of treatment). 
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Nussbaum's argument that decisionmakers' disgust at 
crimes or offenders should be irrelevant to their decisions is dis-
puted by Dan Kahan. 15 Readers will draw their own conclu-
sions, but it seems to me that Nussbaum has the better of this 
debate. For example, both discuss a case in which the state re-
fused to turn over to the representatives of a man convicted of 
the sexual torture and murder of a woman the items he had used 
in the crime and various pornographic literature the state had 
seized from him. The court ruled that returning the property 
would not be consistent with the public interest (the statutory 
standard for dealing with the return of seized property): It would 
"offen[ d] basic concepts of decency" because of the connection 
between that property and the gruesome crime itself. Kahan ar-
gues that only disgust can explain why the court's decision is cor-
rect. He contends that the decision cannot be justified on the 
grounds of rehabilitation of the convict (he was serving a life 
term without parole) or general deterrence (it is unlikely that the 
forfeiture of such property adds any marginal deterrence to such 
a severe sentence, and it is unclear how deterrence required the 
convict to forfeit these particular items, as opposed to money or 
other things of equal value). The only sufficient explanation, 
Kahan asserts, is the court's disgust at giving back to the criminal 
things that "bore the unmistakable aura of his crime," lest "the 
state itself [become] complicit in his depravity." (pp. 66-68) 
Nussbaum counters that public outrage and incredulity, the 
other two emotions (in addition to disgust) which the state spe-
cifically claimed would be a likely result of granting the crimi-
nal's request, themselves adequately explain the correctness of 
the decision; disgust need not be relied upon. The public would 
justifiably be both angered and astonished to learn that the 
criminal was being rewarded, by the return of his property, "in 
just that area where he should be most severely punished," and 
would view the act as profoundly disrespectful to the victim. 
(pp. 53-54) I would simply add that the sense of outrage Nuss-
baum posits encompasses core notions of equity and reciprocity 
that have long been recognized as fundamental to justice (e.g., 
an eye for an eye),16 so (contra Kahan) we do not need disgust to 
explain why the criminal's punishment must include depriving 
him of the very instrumentalities of his crime. Moreover, while 
15. Dan M. Kahan, The Progressive Appropriation of Disgust, in Passions at 63-79 
(cited in note 3). 
16. See Robert C. Solomon, Justice v. Vengeance: On Law and the Satisfaction of 
Emotion, in Passions at 123, 124, 137-40 (cited in note 3). 
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Kahan is correct to point out that disgust is not the only emotion 
that may encourage distancing or excluding the target as an infe-
rior person (as Nussbaum seems to argue) (pp. 51, 54~­
indignation often serves to reaffirm social hierarchy1 -
Nussbaum properly emphasizes the peculiar danger of disgust 
because, more so than indignation or other emotions, disgust 
"treat[ s] the criminal like an insect or a slug, outside of our 
moral community." (p. 54) 
Different cultures deal differently with the emotions that 
crime and punishment generate. Danielle Allen, a professor of 
classics, turns to ancient Greek sources as an exercise in com-
parative sociology (or criminology). 18 Allen suggests a reconcep-
tion of how modern punishment may deal with the victim's and 
the community's anger at crime. Our society is anxious about 
punishment: Denying its basis in the retributive emotions of an-
ger and vengeance sounds as false to human nature as Michael 
Dukakis famously did during his 1988 presidential campaign de-
bate,19 but admitting it risks tying punishment too closely to 
those potentially ugly and unruly emotions. Allen observes that 
Athenians in the classical period seem not to have experienced 
this anxiety. "The Athenians had no doubts about why they 
punished: it was simply because someone was angry at a wrong 
and wanted to have that anger dealt with." (p. 194) But they 
also viewed crime and punishment, and the anger underlying 
both, as a "disease in which everyone was implicated"-
wrongdoer, victim, and community. (p. 194-95) The object of 
punishment was not simply to give vent to the victim's and the 
community's anger at the offender, but to restore the communal 
peace that the crime had disrupted. (p. 197) The annual festival 
17. Kahan, Progressive Appropriation of Disgust at 77-78 n.33 (cited in note 15); see 
also Farber and Sherry, 13 Const. Comm. at 270-71 (cited in note 14) (identifying 
"[a)nimus and hostility" as improper motivations for government action insofar as they 
lead to caste legislation). Note also that fear or anxiety may lead to defensive attribu-
tion, by which the decisionmaker distances himself or herself from and blames the person 
being judged. See Neal Feigenson, Legal Blame: How Jurors Think and Talk About Ac-
cidents 84-85 (American Psychological Association, 2000). 
18. Danielle S. Allen, Democratic Dis-ease: Of Anger and the Troubling Nature of 
Punishment, in Passions at 191-214 (cited in note 3). 
I 9. When asked during a debate with then-Vice President George Bush whether he 
would favor the death penalty if his wife, Kitty, were raped and murdered, Dukakis, 
"[r)ather than expressing outrage at the very mention of such a brutal crime, ... gave a 
detached, emotionless defense of his opposition to capital punishment. The answer was 
viewed as so damaging to Mr. Dukakis' campaign that no Democratic presidential nomi-
nee since then has opposed the death penalty." Bill Sammon, Liberals See Death Penalty 
As Issue, Washington Times (June 14, 2000), <http://www.usembassy.lt/pas/hyperfilel 
efs506.htm> (visited May 22, 2001). 
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of scapegoating was a way of acknowledging that the anger and 
disruption caused by crime was a problem the entire community 
shared, to be resolved by communal action. (p. 198) Leading 
philosophers have since directed our attention otherwise: Plato 
focused on the wrongdoer, not the community, as the sole bearer 
of "disease," justifying punishment that excluded the wrongdoer 
from the community, (p. 201) and Kant sought to explain re-
tributive punishment without reference to anger at all. (pp. 201-
03) Hence our present inability to resolve the anger that moti-
vates both crime and our responses to it. Allen does not pursue 
specifically how contemporary punishment might make its re-
tributive core more ethically satisfying, but other work on for-
giveness and criminal law has begun to do so.20 
As Nussbaum's and Allen's essays show, determining 
whether to censure or embrace a particular emotion for pur-
poses of legal decisionmaking is a complex matter. No contribu-
tor to The Passions of Law better appreciates how our imperfect 
understanding of our emotions ought to complicate the making 
and interpreting of emotion-relevant law than William Ian 
Miller.21 Miller closely and colorfully analyzes the Uniform 
Code of Military Justice's proscription of "Misbehavior before 
the enemy," including running away and other acts of cowardice. 
Typical is Miller's psychological exegesis of the following recol-
lection by a Union officer during the Civil War: 
I wondered then, and I wonder now equally, at the mystery of 
bravery. It seemed to me, as I saw men facing death at Fred-
ericksburg, that they were heroes or cowards in spite of them-
selves. In the charge I saw one soldier falter repeatedly, bow-
ing as if before a hurricane. He would gather himself 
together, gain his place in the ranks, and again drop behind. 
Once or twice he fell to his knees, and at last he sank to the 
ground, still gripping his musket and bowing his head. I lifted 
him to his feet and said, "Coward!" It was cruel, it was 
wicked; but I failed to notice his almost agonized effort to 
command himself. I repeated the bitter word, "Coward!" His 
pale, distorted face flamed. He flung at me, "You lie!" Yet 
he didn't move; he couldn't; his legs would not obey him. I 
left him there in the mud. Soon after the battle he came to 
me with tears in his eyes and said, "Adjutant, pardon me, I 
20. See, e.g., Robert D. Enright and Joanna North, eds., Exploring Forgiveness (U. 
of Wisconsin Press, 1998), especially the chapters by Walter J. Dickey and David Couper. 
21. William Ian Miller, Fear, Weak Legs, and Running Away: A Soldier's Story, in 
Passions at 241-64 (cited in note 3). 
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couldn't go on; but I'm not a coward." Pardon him! I asked 
his forgiveness. (pp. 247-48) 
453 
Should this soldier have been subject to court-martial under 
what is now the catch-all subsection (5), which punishes soldiers 
"guilty of cowardly conduct," if not also the more specific sub-
section (8), which punishes a soldier who "willfully fails to do his 
utmost to encounter, engage, capture, or destroy any enemy 
troops"? To warrant prosecution under the Code, cowardly 
conduct must be motivated by fear, but how do we know that 
another person was moved by fear, when other emotions can 
generate fear's prototypical blanching, sweats, or weakness, and 
when fearful people can suppress these bodily markers? (pp. 
245-46) And if this soldier was not afraid, then how to explain 
his weak legs, which would not obey his conscious will? "With-
out a convincing account of mind and body, emotion and body, 
we do not know how to apportion blame as between body and 
soul." (p. 248) More broadly, which fear-driven fleeing or fail-
ing to attack gets punished when almost all soldiers in all ages 
are presumptively, and justifiably, afraid in battle? Miller pro-
ceeds to make much good sense of the statute's amalgam of dic-
tates against fearful conduct, but ultimately what sets his contri-
bution apart from most of the others in the book is his 
acknowledgment of how difficult it may be to reconcile legal 
rules with psychological reality in cases in which our grasp of the 
latter is uncertain. 
The essays in The Passions of Law indicate the breadth of 
emotion-in-law inquiry not simply by addressing such an impres-
sive variety of legal topics but also by implicating so many dif-
ferent ways in which emotions figure in law. At least nine are 
examined: (1) the extent to which the law should recognize spe-
cific emotions of legal actors by making those emotions explicit 
(or strongly implicit) factors in or elements of the relevant legal 
claim or defense;22 (2) how particular emotional reactions to 
certain acts shared by (the vast majority of?) members of the 
community constitute "the bedrock of many of our moral rules" 
22. E.g., Posner, Emotion versus Emotionalism at 313-17 (cited in note 3) (disputing 
that a criminal's hate for the victim [as currently identified by "hate crimes"] should war-
rant more severe punishment than would the same offense if not motivated by hatred); 
Nussbaum, 'Secret Sewers of Vice' at 35-38 (cited in note 7) (arguing that a homicide de-
fendant's disgust toward his homosexual victim should not be recognized as a provoca-
tion, mitigating his punishment); Austin Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility, and Criminal 
Punishment: An Analysis of Popular Culture, in Passions at 168-90 (cited in note 3) (ex-
plaining that popular culture considers a criminal's remorse relevant to the degree of 
punishment the criminal deserves). 
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that are also legal rules;23 (3) how popular understandings of 
particular emotions may contribute to the implicit knowledge 
frameworks that lead legislators to craft laws as they do;24 ( 4) 
whether particular emotional reactions by decisionmakers are 
reliable guides to what constitutes an instance of an offense25 or 
what punishment is deserved;26 (5) the extent to which good de-
cisionmaking depends on having or being capable of having a 
particular emotional state or sufficient "emotional intelligence" 
more generally;27 (6) whether the law should attempt to induce 
specific emotions in convicted crirninals;28 (7) how the law 
should respond to the presence of specific emotional reactions 
on the part of victims of crime or the community in which the 
crime is committed (say, anger)-reject, tolerate, or welcome 
that emotion (perhaps with conditions) into the decisionrnaking 
process;29 (8) relatedly, how legal processes and institutions may 
perform a therapeutic role by helping victims cope with their 
emotions30 or communities channel anger at wrongdoing into 
"building bridges" with transgressors and among themselves;31 
and finally (9) how law's authority rna~ depend on an emotional 
bond between the law and its subjects. 2 Furthermore, the inclu-
23. Posner, Emotion versus Emotionalism at 318, 322 (cited in note 3) (enumerating 
list of "moral offenses"). 
24. Cheshire Calhoun, Making Up Emotional People: The Case of Romantic Love, 
in Passions at 217-40 (cited in note 3) (contending that homosexuals are excluded from 
popular notions of romantic love, which underlies their unequal treatment under laws 
such as the Defense of Marriage Act); Miller, Fear, Weak Legs, and Running Away at 
241-64 (cited in note 21) (investigating fear-inspired cowardice). 
25. E.g., Kahan, Progressive Appropriation of Disgust at 69-71 (cited in note 15) 
(arguing that disgust properly signals "hate crime"). 
26. E.g., Jeffrie G. Murphy, Moral Epistemology, the Retributive Emotions, and the 
'Clumsy Moral Philosophy' of Jesus Christ, in Passions at 149-67 (cited in note 3) (doubt-
ing whether resentment, guilt, or any other emotion properly undergirds retribution). 
27. E.g., id. (advocating moral humility); Posner, Emotion versus Emotionalism at 
322-24 (cited in note 3) (arguing that judges should be capable of indignation and empa-
thy); Samuel H. Pillsbury, Harlan, Holmes, and the Passions of Justice, in Passions at 330-
62 (cited in note 3) (relating the first John Marshall Harlan's capacity for outrage and 
Oliver Wendell Holmes's passion for ideas to their leading decisions). 
28. Toni M. Massaro, Show (Some) Emotions, in Passions at 80-120 (cited in note 
3) (arguing against the imposition of shaming penalties to induce humiliation); Posner, 
Emotion versus Emotionalism at 319-21 (cited in note 3) (largely agreeing, though stating 
his position less forcefully). 
29. E.g., Solomon, Justice v. Vengeance at 123-48 (cited in note 16) (justifying 
vengeance, properly construed, as part of the process of punishment); Allen, Democratic 
Dis-ease at 191-214 (cited in note 18). 
30. Martha Minow, Institutions and Emotions: Redressing Mass Violence, in Pas-
sions at 264-81 (cited in note 3) (discussing truth and reconciliation commissions and 
other responses to mass violence). 
31. Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility, and Criminal Punishment at 178, 182 (cited in 
note 22); Allen, Democratic Dis-ease at 195-98 (cited in note 18). 
32. John Dcigh, Emotion and the Authority of Law: Variation on Themes in Ben-
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sion of essays that apply a single emotion to a variety of legal 
contexts (e.g., Nussbaum on disgust) as well as those that explore 
the multiple emotions relevant to a single legal context (e.g., 
Jeffrie Murphy on retributive emotions and moral humility in 
punishment) hints by a kind of synecdoche at the kinds of inter-
actions that a comprehensive, systematic treatment of emotions 
in law would survey. By thus suggesting the range and complex-
ity of interrelationships among specific emotions, types of legal 
problems, and aspects of legal processes, The Passions of Law 
should, at the very least, discourage legal scholars and judges 
from overly facile treatments of the subject.33 
The particularity of the respective authors' approaches is 
partly at odds with another generally desirable feature of an-
thologies, which is that the essays should speak to each other or 
at least cross paths. Yet the essays here accomplish this to some 
extent. For instance, in Part I, "Disgust and Shame," Nussbaum 
and Kahan explicitly engage one another on the relevance of de-
cisionmakers' disgust to their judgments, and Toni Massaro 
takes on Kahan's advocacy of shaming penalties by arguing, 
among other things, that the variability of people's susceptibility 
to, experiences of, and behavioral responses to shame are likely 
to undermine the goals of shaming.34 In Part II, "Remorse and 
the Desire for Revenge," Jeffrie Murphy, Robert Solomon, and 
Danielle Allen each present a different perspective on the extent 
to which the retributive emotions supply a valid basis for pun-
ishment (and Solomon explicitly refers to Murphy's essay). 
Solomon, Allen, and Austin Sarat also sound a theme that reso-
nates with one of Nussbaum's main concerns: how coming to 
terms with the emotions that we feel when punishing the guilty 
can affect relationships among offender, victim, and community, 
and hence the ongoing well-being of the community.35 And in 
tham and Austin, in Passions at 285-308 (cited in note 3). 
33. Of the sort for which Pillsbury criticizes Judge Hiller Zobel in the Louise 
Woodward trial, the famous "Nanny Case." See Pillsbury, Harlan, Holmes, and the Pas-
sions of Justice at 354-56 (cited in note 27). 
34. Massaro, Show (Some) Emotions at 84-97 (cited in note 28). Massaro also cau-
tions against Kahan's advocacy (implicit in the title of his essay) that liberals "fight dis-
gust with disgust," explaining: "We cannot assume that the release of our suppressed dis-
gust and revulsion toward criminals will inevitably yield more enlightened justice because 
we will better contain the excesses of our strong emotions if they are exposed to the light 
of public scrutiny than if they go underground and resurface elsewhere." Id at 99. 
35. See Nussbaum, 'Secret Sewers of Vice' at 51-52 (cited in note 7) (arguing that 
validating disg4_st at offenders tends to treat them as aliens, excludable from the commu-
nity); Solomon, Justice v. Vengeance at 142-43 (cited in note 16) (claiming that venge-
ance, properly construed, cares about the relationship between victim, offender, and 
avenger); Murphy, Moral Epistemology at 159-60 (cited in note 26) (arguing that moral 
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Part IV, "The Passion for Justice," Posner disagrees with Kahan 
on hate crimes.36 Kahan contends that disgust inevitably infuses 
the law's evaluation of certain crimes and criminals, so liberals 
would do well, through hate crime legislation (or other means), 
to see that the law reflects their valuations of what sorts of crimi-
nals ought to be especially despised (i.e., those who target mem-
bers of oppressed groups for violence ).37 Posner believes this 
political or ideological component of hate crime laws is precisely 
why they should not be allowed, and dismisses the Supreme 
Court's ostensibly non-political defense of those laws against 
First Amendment challenge as "judicial sophistry."38 
The topics highlighted by the presence of these colloquies 
are no less worthy of emphasis than others the editor and/or con-
tributors might have chosen. Of course, any collection of essays 
is bound to omit some important subjects. Given Bandes's own 
enumeration of the legal contexts that emotion pervades, (p. 2) 
readers might also have looked for analyses of the role of emo-
tions in civil (as opposed to criminal) cases39 and in lawyer-client 
relations and advocacy (as opposed to legislation and adjudica-
tion). Some of those analyses would be of particular interest to 
constitutional law scholars. For example, because the reprehen-
sibility of a tort defendant's conduct is central to the reasonable-
humility forces those who sit in judgment to face the question whether it is superior 
moral character rather than luck or circumstance that has led them to avoid being the 
one judged); Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility, and Criminal Punishment at 178, 182 (cited 
in note 22) (stating that "[r)emorse builds a bridge between offender and the community 
astonished by his deed"); Allen, Democratic Dis-ease at 204-06 (cited in note 18) (arguing 
that classical Athenian criminal procedure tried to resolve anger in order to repair the 
damage to the community done by the crime). 
36. Posner, Emotion versus Emotionalism at 313-17 (cited in note 3). Posner cites 
an earlier article by Kahan and Nussbaum as exemplary of the position with which he 
disagrees. Id. at 315 n.9. See Dan M. Kahan and Martha C. Nussbaum, Two Concep-
tions of Emotion in Criminal Law, 96 Colum. L. Rev. 269 (1996). 
37. Kahan, Progressive Appropriation of Disgust at 69-71 (cited in note 15). 
38. Posner, Emotion versus Emotionalism at 316 (cited in note 3) (citing Wisconsin 
v. Mitchell, 508 U.S. 476 (1993)). Posner also disagrees with Nussbaum on the legal sig-
nificance of disgust and with Kahan on the viability of shaming penalties. Id at 319-22. 
Also in Part IV, Pillsbury diverges from Nussbaum on the general relationship between 
emotion and the kind of public discourse ideally reflected in law, largely because they 
look at different ends of the emotion elephant: Nussbaum at particular emotional states 
that she argues do (indignation) or do not (disgust) support such discourse, while Pills-
bury is concerned with individual variations in emotional traits (which, of course, would 
cut against intersubjective agreement of the sort required to support a shared discourse). 
Compare Pillsbury, Harlan, Holmes, and the Passions of Justice at 352 (cited in note 27) 
with Nussbaum, 'Secret Sewers of Vice' at 26-17 (cited in note 7). Otherwise, the essays 
in Parts III ("Love, Forgiveness, and Cowardice") and IV do not join issue with each 
other or with essays elsewhere in the book. 
39. Minow, Institutions and Emotions at 272-76 (cited in note 30), does address the 
supposed therapeutic functions of ADR, drawing on cognitive emotion theory. 
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ness of any punitive damage award,40 an examination of how an-
ger and related emotions bear on perceived reprehensibility 
would be germane to the evaluation of punitive damages under 
the Due Process Clause. Another worthwhile inquiry could ad-
dress the relevance of lawyers' emotions and emotional labors 
(e.g., the suppression of unpleasant emotions or the reduction of 
dissonance among conflicting emotional comrnitmentst1 to their 
clients' right to effective assistance of counsel.42 
In addition, while some of the essays provide the sort of de-
tailed legal contextualization which Bandes correctly posits as 
essential for understanding the roles that emotions do and ought 
to play in legal judgment, (pp. 9, 12-13) others do not achieve the 
same specific, practical focus. The essays in Part II on anger, 
vengeance, and remorse in criminal law, for instance, plainly 
bear on the heated constitutional litigation regarding victim im-
pact statements,43 about which Bandes herself, among others, 
has written so well.44 Yet the essays in this gortion of the book 
mention victim impact statements only once. 
A more serious limitation of The Passions of Law is its fail-
ure to make better use of available interdisciplinary scholarship 
on the emotions. Those inclined to take emotions in law seri-
ously need whatever guidance empirical research can offer about 
how particular emotions work, what stimuli provoke them, and 
what effects they are likely to have on the various processes of 
legal judgment, so that they may think most productively about 
whether and how the law should respond to those emotions. To 
begin with, the introduction might have situated the essays more 
40. E.g., BMW of North America v. Gore, 517 U.S. 559, 575 (1996) (holding puni-
tive damage award 500 times the amount of plaintiffs actual harm to be "grossly exces-
sive" and thus in violation of Due Process Clause of Fourteenth Amendment). 
41. See, e.g., The Role of Emotion in Lawyering (panel presentation by Susan Ban-
des, Robert Rosen, and Neal Feigenson, Working Group on Law, Culture, and the Hu-
manities, Washington, DC, March 10, 2000) (papers on file with author). 
42. See, e.g., Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984) (holding defendant's 
Sixth Amendment right to effective assistance of counsel not violated during capital sen-
tencing phase even though court-appointed lawyer admitted feeling "hopeless" about 
saving defendant's life and conducted no investigation into possible mitigating factors). 
43. See, e.g., Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808 (1991) (holding Eighth Amendment 
permits capital juries to hear victim impact evidence in sentencing phase). 
44. Susan Bandes, Empathy, Narrative, and Victim Impact Statements, 63 U. Chi. L. 
Rev. 361 (1996). 
. 45. Sarat, Remorse, Responsibility, and Criminal Punishment at 178, 189 n.53 (cited 
m note 22). Among the essays lacking in practical focus I would also include Deigh, 
Emotion and the Authority of Law (cited in note 32) (which, to be fair, is a work of theo-
retical jurisprudence which does not purport to apply to specific, practical legal prob-
lems). 
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firmly in the relevant literatures. During the last decade or so, 
for instance, a growing number of articles in law reviews and in-
terdisciplinary journals such as Law and Human Behavior have 
drawn on psychology to explore the place of emotion in law. A 
brief literature review would help establish this context.46 
The Passions of Law offers much valuable philosophizing 
about emotion, some of it by the most distinguished persons in 
the field. Not only is philosophical analysis required to deter-
mine whether particular emotions ought to figure in legal judg-
ment, but it is hard to imagine useful empirical research on the 
emotions without philosophical underpinnings that help to shape 
the research hypotheses and the interpretation of their signifi-
cance. Greater empiricism, however, would help tether philoso-
phical argument to the book's stated practical purposes. 
Some of the essays are explicitly well grounded in psychol-
ogy and other emotion research and theory. For instance, Nuss-
baum, Massaro, and Calhoun all cite sufficiently for purposes of 
their respective arguments to relevant empirical research, and 
Massaro and Miller are especially sensitive to the limits of the 
knowledge on which they draw. (Solomon's citations are less ex-
tensive but he writes with the authority of being himself the au-
thor of leading works in the field.t7 By contrast, Minow, who 
writes clearly, albeit briefly, about the psychological effects of 
dispute resolution processes, cites to only one source in the field, 
a collection of readings, while Posner lists cognitive theorists of 
emotion in his first footnote but otherwise refers to only two ar-
ticles in interdisciplinary (psychology and law) journals. More is 
needed.48 Here are a few ways in which research on the emo-
tions can assist legal scholars and practitioners in dealing with 
specific issues raised in the book. 
46. It would also have been helpful to include in the introduction or perhaps in an 
appendix a brief list of references to leading background literature on emotion research 
and theory in general, as well as to other work on important specific psychological and 
other questions that the essays in the book necessarily address in a limited fashion if at 
all. 
47. E.g., Passions (Anchor Press, Doubleday, 1976); A Passion for Justice (Adisson-
Wesley, 1990). 
48. Doing better interdisciplinary work by utilizing emotion research and theory 
better is not a matter of first nailing down some consensus definition of "emotion" or 
agreed-upon theory of how to understand emotions. As Bandes correctly recognizes, 
there are no such things, and the essays themselves prove that this lack of foundations in 
the source discipline is no insuperable obstacle to useful inquiry into emotions in law. 
Introduction at 10-11 (cited in note 6). I agree, however, with Laura Little's argument 
that a deeper understanding of emotion theory would illuminate some of the debates in 
the present volume. See Little, 86 Cornell L. Rev. at 981-86 (cited in note 4). 
2001] BOOK REVIEWS 459 
One obvious and important question raised by inquiries into 
the proper role of emotion in law concerns the ability of people 
to regulate their emotional responses and associated behaviors. 
If and to the extent that reflection leads us to want to discourage 
the use of certain emotions in legal decisionmaking (as Nuss-
baum would like to do with disgust, (p. 22) and Posner, (excess) 
"emotionalism" (pp. 311, 324)) how can this be done, given that 
proscribing emotion in the letter of the law hardly assures its ab-
sence in practice? (Consider, for instance, the admonition in 
standard civil jury instructions that jurors are "not to be swayed 
by sympathy for or prejudice against either party.") Conversely, 
can the law "educate" decisionmakers to include desirable emo-
tions in their judgment processes, as Bandes wonders? (p. 14) A 
substantial literature on emotional intelligence49 and emotional 
control50 indicates that decisionmakers may, in some circum-
stances and to some extent, regulate their emotional responses 
to the matters before them and the effects of those responses on 
their judgments. Research also indicates conditions under which 
attempts at emotional regulation may be ineffective or even 
backfire, leading to greater reliance on the proscribed feeling. 51 
Another way to mitigate decisionmakers' use of unwanted 
emotions is to exclude emotion-provoking stimuli. As Posner 
recognizes, "[t]he law has an elaborate set of doctrines for fend-
ing off dangerous intrusions of emotion into the judicial proc-
ess . . . . A proper understanding and critique of these rules [of 
evidence] might profit greatly from a careful examination of 
them in the light cast by the systematic study of the role of emo-
tions in law." (p. 327) This is but part of a broader issue, logi-
cally prior to emotional self-regulation, on which emotion re-
search can shed light: How do emotions actually interact with 
non-emotional cognitions to produce legal judgments? Apart 
from Posner's cogent but incomplete discussion of how empathy 
can help counter the availability heuristic, (pp. 323-24) the au-
thors do not make much use of the psychological research and 
theory on emotions and social judgment.52 Readers could better 
49. See, e.g., Daniel Goleman, Emotional Intelligence (Bantam Books, 1995); Peter 
Salovey and John D. Mayer, Emotional Intelligence, 9 Imagination, Cognition, & Person- • 
ality 185 (1990). 
50. See generally, e.g., Daniel Wegner and James Pennebaker, eds., Handbook of 
Mental Control (Prentice Hall, 1993). 
51. See, e.g., Kari Edwards and Tamara S. Bryan, Judgmental Biases Produced by 
Instructions to Disregard: The (Paradoxical) Case of Emotional Information, 23 Personal-
Ity & Soc. Psycho!. Bull. 849 (1997). 
52. See, e.g., Joseph P. Forgas, ed., Emotion and Social Judgments (Pergamon 
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evaluate Posner's call for judicial empathy, for instance, if they 
knew more about empathy's other effects on judgment, includ-
ing the subjectivity and other biases to which the perspective-
taking inherent in empathy has been shown to lead.53 Without 
drawing on that kind of research, legal scholars can hardly hope 
to determine whether and when "emotion in concert with cogni-
tion [may] lead[ ] to truer perception and, ultimately, to better 
(more accurate, more moral, more just) decisions," as Bandes 
believes it does. (p. 7) 
Several essays debate whether it is better to bring to the sur-
face and thus confront the emotions that may be driving our de-
cisions than to ignore or sup};?ress them, especially emotions that 
are likely to be destructive. " In addition to the work on emo-
tional intelligence and control mentioned above, which would 
help legal scholars understand the limits of our abilities to rec-
ognize and respond to our emotions, psychological studies of the 
health and other effects of individuals' suppression or expression 
of emotion55 could (to the extent these findings are generalizable 
from individual to group effects) help the legal community 
evaluate the likely consequences of welcoming versus excluding 
particular emotions from legal decisionmaking. 
Finally, a number of the essays raise the issue of how indi-
vidual variations in emotional experience and behavior should 
affect legal policy and decisionmaking.56 Massaro supports her 
argument on this point with references to psychological work on 
shaming, but does not make use of research on emotional state 
variations across individuals more generally. And Pillsbury, who 
Press, 1991); Joseph P. Forgas, ed., Feeling and Thinking (Cambridge U. Press, 2000). 
For references to the literature and analyses of the effects of particular emotions on legal 
judgments, see Feigenson, Legal Blame at 74-86 (cited in note 17). 
53. See Neal R. Feigenson, Sympathy and Legal Judgment: A Psychological Analy· 
sis, 65 Tenn. L. Rev. 1, 46-64 (1997). 
54. See Massaro, Show (Some) Emotions at 98-101 (cited in note 28) (Massaro dis-
putes Kahan's contention that it is better for the law to express disgust with a criminal 
than to suppress it); Allen, Democratic Dis-ease at 205-06 (cited in note 18) (arguing that 
community may benefit by acknowledging and attempting to resolve the anger behind 
the urge to punish). 
55. See, e.g., James Pennebaker, Confession, Inhibition, and Disease, in Leonard 
Berkowitz, ed., 22 Advances in Experimental Social Psychology 211 (1989); Keith J. 
Petrie, Roger J. Booth, and James W. Pennebaker, The Immunological Effects of 
Thought Suppression, 75 J. Personality & Soc. Psycho!. 1264 (1998). 
56. See Bandes, Introduction at 13 (cited in note 6) (raising the issue); Massaro, 
Show (Some) Emotions at 82-89 (cited in note 28) (arguing that individual variations in 
experience of and response to shame undermine validity of shaming penal~ies); ~i!Isbury, 
Harlan, Holmes, and the Passions of Justice at 334-49 (cited m note 27) (discussmg effect 
of judges' emotional traits on their decisionmaking). 
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alone in the anthology analyzes the effect of individual differ-
ences in emotional traits on legal decisionmaking, does not cite 
to any of the psychology literature on this subject.57 A more 
thorough consideration of what psychology and other empirical 
disciplines have learned about this and other subjects would help 
Pillsbury (and other legal scholars) to achieve not only his stated 
goal of overcoming "the conceptual and terminologic inade-
quacy of most current discussions of emotion in law," (p. 331) 
but also the broader Realist aim, which Pillsbury endorses, (p. 
331 n.4) of attuning law to the psychological reality of emotion. 
The Passions of Law is an excellent introduction to a topic 
that is bound to grow in importance. The contributors present 
careful and sophisticated investigations into a variety of interac-
tions between emotions and legal issues. Their work should en-
hance interest in and respect for interdisciplinary work in this 
field. As legal practice and discourse increasingly embrace 
popular forms of communication, including emotion-laden visual 
displays of all kinds, the impact of emotions on legal judgments 
will only become more compelling and more in need of critical 
analysis. Further inquiries in the directions explored in this 
book, making even better use of emotion research and theory in 
other disciplines, would help to answer this need. 
57. For a brief introduction to a range of views on the subject, see Ekman and 
Davidson, eds., The Nature of Emotion at 321-43 (cited in note 11). 
